In Gaussian quantum key distribution eavesdropping attacks are conventionally modeled through the universal entangling cloner scheme, which is based on the premise that the whole environment is under control of the adversary, i.e., the eavesdropper purifies the system. This assumption implies that the eavesdropper has either access to an identity (noiseless) channel or infinite amount of entanglement in order to simulate such an identity channel. In this work, we challenge the necessity of this assumption, and we propose a teleportationbased eavesdropping attack, where the eavesdropper is not assumed to have access to the shared channel, that represents the unavoidable noise due to the environment. Under collective measurements, this attack reaches optimality in the limit of infinite amount of entanglement, while for finite entanglement resources it outperforms the corresponding optimal individual attack. We also calculate the minimum amount of distributed entanglement that is necessary for this eavesdropping scheme, since we consider it as the operationally critical quantity capturing the limitations of a realistic attack. We conclude that the fact that infinite amount of entanglement is required for an optimal collective eavesdropping attack signifies the robustness of Gaussian quantum key distribution.
The most powerful attack Eve can asymptotically perform is the so-called collective attack [9] , where she prepares and interacts a set of individual and identical quantum systems with the quantum signals sent from Alice to Bob. She then stores the output ensemble into her quantum memory for a future collective measurement (an individual attack would rely on individual measurements respectively). Unconditional security of a QKD protocol can be achieved by upper bounding the information Eve can extract, also known as the Holevo bound [10] .
The question we answer in the context of Gaussian QKD in this letter is the following: can Eve optimally attack the system under collective measurements without having access to the quantum channel between Alice and Bob? In other words, we investigate the necessity of the first assumption (discussed before) regarding Eve's capabilities. We conclude that it is indeed not necessary for Eve to have access to the channel in order to collectively attack a system as long as she can perform an all-optical teleportation [11] over it. In particular, we propose a teleportation-based eavesdropping scheme that serves as an alternative type of attack to the well-known entangling cloner [12] [13] [14] that assumes Eve's access to the shared quantum channel.
We further discuss how, under this scheme, Eve's information depends on the amount of entanglement she can prepare, distribute and distill in order to successfully perform the alloptical teleportation protocol [11] (see Refs. [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] for different types of quantum teleportation). Employing collective measurements, and using a resource state with the least required amount of entanglement, Eve's information reaches the bound for optimal individual attacks [22, 23] . Using the same setup and taking the limit to infinite entanglement for the resource state, Eve's information approaches the ultimate bound for an eavesdropping attack, also known as the Holevo bound [10] .
We identify the distributed entanglement used as a resource for teleportation as the operationally critical quantity capturing the limitations of a realistic Eve (e.g. for a given separation of Alice and Bob one can estimate a minimum amount of loss, and Eve's quantum information processing resources that bound the amount of pure entanglement that could be distilled across such a lossy channel). Under this limitation we evaluate the secret key rate that Alice and Bob achieve conditioned on their belief on how powerful (in entanglement resources) Eve is. Note that other types of physical limitations on Eve's capabilities for CV-QKD systems have also been studied in the context of Eve's restricted quantum memory [24] , and Eve's restriction to receive all the photons lost in transmission [25] Gaussian CV-QKD. A generic QKD protocol in prepareand-measure (PM) scheme consists of: (i) quantum communication, where one party (Alice) encodes classical information into conjugate quantum basis states, which are sent through an insecure quantum channel to another party (Bob), who measures the received quantum states in a randomly chosen basis, resulting in two sets of correlated data between Alice and Bob, and (ii) classical communication (also called classical postprocessing) over a public but authenticated classical channel, where Alice and Bob extract a secret key from the correlated data they collected during the previous step.
In a fully Gaussian CV-QKD protocol [26, 27] (in the PM scheme) Alice encodes a classical random variable "a" (drawn from a Gaussian distribution) onto Gaussian quantum states, squeezed states [28] or coherent states [29] , and sends them through an insecure quantum channel to Bob, who measures the received quantum states using homodyne or heterodyne detection to obtain a classical random variable "b".
Gaussian (collective or individual) attacks are asymptotically optimal [30] [31] [32] [33] , and the asymptotic secret key rate against optimal collective attacks is given by [34, 35] 
where I(a:b) is the classical mutual information between Alice and Bob, and S(x:E) is the maximum mutual information between Alice (x≡a) and Eve (in the direct reconciliation where Alice is the reference of the reconciliation in the classical post-processing), or between Bob (x≡b) and Eve (in the reverse reconciliation where Bob is the reference of the reconciliation). The coefficient 0 β 1 is the reconciliation efficiency [36, 37] . Note that the maximum amount of information Eve can possibly extract from the collective attack is upper bounded by the Holevo bound χ(x:E) [10] , i.e., S(x:E) χ(x:E) .
Gaussian states [27, [38] [39] [40] σ are the ones that can be fully characterized by the mean value and the variance of the quadrature field operatorsq := (x 1 ,p 1 , . . . ,x n ,p n ) T , witĥ x j :=â j +â † j andp j := i(â † j −â j ), whereâ j andâ † j are the annihilation and creation operators, respectively. Without losing generality we assume that the mean value is zero and the state can be fully described by a real, symmetric and positivedefinite matrix called the covariance matrix, whose arbitrary element is given by σ ij = 1 2 {q i ,q j } . The covariance matrix in the standard form [41, 42] is given by ζ < 1 we denote the squeezing parameter. The covariance matrix transformation for a two-mode Gaussian state σ in passing through a single-mode phase-insensitive Gaussian channel G is given by [43] 
where U = √ τ 1, with τ > 0 representing the transmissivity or the gain, and V = v1, with v = |1 − τ |ε > 0 representing the additive noise (ε = 1 for pure and ε > 1 for thermal channels, respectively).
Let us assume that Alice and Bob identify in their inbetween interaction a phase-insensitive channel G, that we assume to be a thermal lossy channel with transmissivity 0 < τ < 1 and noise v = (1 − τ )ε, but the result can be trivially extended to any non-entanglement-breaking [44] phase-insensitive channel.
Each Gaussian PM scheme can be represented using an equivalent entanglement-based scheme [26] , where Alice prepares a pure Gaussian entangled state, i.e., a two-mode squeezed vacuum state σ in with squeezing parameter 0 < ζ < 1, keeping one mode while sending the second mode through the quantum channel. If Alice applies a homodyne (heterodyne) detection, the second mode of the entangled states is projected onto a squeezed (coherent) state. While in the experimental demonstration of CV-QKD, PM scheme is preferred, the entanglement-based scheme is favored for the security analysis. Before we propose our scheme, let us briefly review the current way we model individual/collective attacks.
Universal Entangling Cloner Attack. In the entangling cloner setup [12] [13] [14] , the whole channel G is associated with a potential eavesdropper that has full control of the environment. Eve uses a two-mode squeezed vacuum state and mixes one arm of it with Alice's signal in a beam-splitter with transmissivity equal to the transmissivity of the quantum channel. For the collective attack, one of the outputs is sent directly to Bob while the rest are stored in her quantum memory. Finally, she collectively measures the stored ensemble to gain the maximum information about the distributed key. This scheme is schematically represented in Fig. 1 .
An assumption that has been taken in this setup is that Eve is able to noiselessly transmit the output signal of the beamsplitter to Bob, i.e., the output signal passes through an identity channel 1. Obviously, this is a really strong assumption, since Eve has to deal with some unavoidable decoherence due to environmental reasons that go beyond her control, but even theoretically that is impossible because simulating identity channels through teleportation in CV systems requires an infinite amount of entanglement.
For the case of optimal individual attacks it has already been shown [22, 23] that they can be realistically modeled through the standard CV-teleportation protocol [18] , however this protocol is dependent on individual Bell-type measurements, and thus it cannot be directly used for collective attacks. In order to realistically model an optimal collective attack, we propose below an eavesdropping scheme, based on the all-optical teleportation protocol [11] that is measurementfree.
All-optical Teleportation Attack. In this type of attack, that is schematically represented in Fig. 1 , we start by assuming that there exists a physical quantum channel, G, between Alice and Bob, through which all the participants (including Eve) must send their signals. Given this limitation, Eve (who is allowed to establish stations arbitrarily close to Alice's and Bob's laboratories) performs an all-optical teleportation pro-
On the top panel we present the entangling cloner attack, where Eve has full control of the environment and simulates the channel G through a beam-splitter Bτ (with the same transmissivity as the channel). One input of the beam-splitter is Alice's signal and the other is one arm of Eve's state ϕ . With M1−2 we represent the measurements that Eve performs later on her quantum memory on her state µ , and 1 the identity channel. On the bottom panel, we present the all-optical teleportation attack. In this attack, Eve has no access to the quantum channel G and she performs an all-optical teleportation over the signal sent from Alice. With ρ we denote Eve's resource state. The all-optical teleportation consists of a two-mode squeezer Sg with gain g, which is in Eve's first station close to Alice's laboratory, and a beam-splitter Bt with transmissivity t = 1/g, which is in Eve's second station close to Bob's laboratory (see supplemental material for more information about the all-optical teleportation). One mode of Eve's resource state ρ is sent to the first station as an input of Sg. The other mode of ρ is sent to the second station and is mixed on a beam-splitter Bη with another state ϕ, before it becomes an input to Bt. Finally Eve performs the measurements M1−3 on her state µ that was stored in the quantum memory. For a pure channel G, both the entangling cloner and the all-optical teleportation attack need to substitute the state ϕ with a single-mode vacuum state |0 . tocol [11] over this channel G (details about this type of teleportation can be found in the supplemental material). In general, any Gaussian channel can be simulated via a quantum teleportation protocol using an appropriate resource state [45] [46] [47] . Given a Gaussian phase-insensitive channel G the set of all resource states that can simulate it have been derived in Ref. [48] (see also Ref. [49] for special cases).
For our purposes, we assume that Eve can prepare, distribute and distill a pure two-mode squeezed vacuum state ρ with squeezing parameter 0 γ < 1. One arm of it is used for the initial amplification (performed on Eve's station close to Alice's side) through the two-mode squeezer S g with gain g > 1 [50] . Employing a beam-splitter B η with transmissivity 0 η 1, we mix the second arm of ρ with one arm of another two-mode squeezed vacuum state ϕ with squeezing parameter 0 κ < 1 (that is prepared and used on Eve's station close to Bob's side). One output of B η is headed to another beam-splitter B t with transmissivity t = 1/g for the final attenuation of the signal before it is forwarded to Bob.
The final step for Eve is to perform a collective measurement on the modes that she has stored in her quantum memory, that we denote as a quantum state µ. Theoretically, the maximum information that she can extract from those measurements is given by [26] S(x:E) = S(µ) − S(µ|x) ,
where S(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy, that can be calculated through the symplectic eigenvalues ν i of a N -mode state [27, 39, 51] , via
and S(µ|x) is the von Neumann entropy for Eve's quantum system conditioned on Alice or Bob's measurement. The challenging part for Eve is to prepare, distribute and distill pure entangled states ρ over the corresponding distance between Alice and Bob. Thus, we assess her performance through the amount of entanglement of her state ρ. The least amount of entanglement needed for the simulation of the channel G [48] , and consecutively for any teleportation-based attack is given by
where
with E being the entropy of entanglement [52] , given by
The reason we employ the entropy of entanglement to quantify the entanglement of the resource state ρ is because it is assumed to be pure. However, any proper entanglement measure, e.g., entanglement of formation [52] , relative entropy of entanglement [53] , squashed entanglement [54] etc, reduces to Eq. (9) for pure states.
We should note that for a pure loss channel G the two-mode squeezed vacuum state ϕ is reduced to a single-mode vacuum |0 for both the entangling cloner and the all-optical teleportation attack.
Discussion. For our numerical calculations we consider an entanglement-based CV-QKD protocol, where both Alice and Bob apply heterodyne detection on their entangled modes. The left plot of Fig. 2 shows Eve's information for this protocol in the reverse reconciliation scenario, calculated via Eq. (5) and maximized over the parameters {η, κ} that can simulate the channel G, as a function of the entanglement of FIG. 2. Eve's information and key rate. We assume that the quantum channel that Alice and Bob initially share is a thermal loss channel G with transmissivity equal to τ = 0.25, corresponding to approximately 30km of optical fiber assuming about 0.2dB/km loss, and additive noise ε = 1.01. Alice's state is a two-mode squeezed vacuum with squeezing parameter ζ = 0.7, and the reconciliation efficiency is set equal to β = 0.95 [55, 56] . Alice and Bob measure their modes with heterodyne detection, and Eve performs an all-optical teleportation attack in the limit of g → ∞ (The protocol works for finite amount of gain g as well but with less success for Eve). In figure (a) with the solid blue line we plot the amount of information S(b:E) Eve can extract in the reverse reconciliation scenario against the entanglement of her pure resource state E(ρ), parametrized over the squeezing parameter γ [see Eq. (9)]. The minimum value of entanglement E(γmin) corresponds to about 4.2dB of squeezing. The horizontal red dashed line represents the Holevo bound χ(b:E), that is the maximum amount of information an eavesdropper can physically extract. In the limit of infinite entanglement, i.e., E(γ → 1) → ∞, we see that this bound is reached. With the green dot-dashed line we indicate the maximum amount of information Eve can extract through an optimal individual attack [22, 23] . In figure (b) we have the corresponding key rate that Alice and Bob measure given Eve's collective attack. Again, the red dashed line is the minimum possible key rate that they can extract, and the green dot-dashed represents the key rate based on the optimal individual attack. In both plots we indicate the non-physical areas with grey color. state ρ. Let us mention here that in case of a pure loss channel G there is no need for an optimization, since the transmissivity can be just set equal to η = τ /γ 2 . The value for the Holevo bound that Eve has to reach is given by [26] 
where S(σ out |b) is the von Neumann entropy of the entangled state shared between Alice and Bob conditioned on Bob's measurement. The right plot of Fig. 2 shows the achievable secret key rate calculated by Alice and Bob, based on Eq. (1) and the mutual information, which for this protocol is given by
We also plot the corresponding values for Eve's information and secret key rate under an optimal individual attack [22, 23] . We observe that when Eve uses the minimum required amount of entanglement resources, i.e., E(γ min ), the attack reduces to the optimal individual attack. At this point, the beam-splitter B η is not interacting with the signal, i.e., η = 1, and the parameter κ becomes irrelevant.
Eve's information monotonically increases with the amount of entanglement, and it approaches the Holevo bound in the limit of infinite entanglement, i.e., E(γ→1) → ∞. In this extreme point, the beam-splitter B η has transmissivity equal to the channel's transitivity, i.e., η = τ , and the state ϕ has a squeezing parameter κ = (ε − 1)/(ε + 1). It is worth noting that the teleportation part of the protocol at this stage is operating under the Choi-state [57] (maximally entangled state sent through the channel).
The notion of optimality in the extreme case of infinite entanglement E(γ→1) → ∞ is justified by the fact that a physical bound is reached i.e., the Holevo bound, that we cannot surpass. A meaningful question to ask at this point may be the following: for a given finite amount of entanglement what is the optimal collective attack? To this day, a physical limit that upper bounds the amount of classical information that can be extracted from a quantum channel under the use of finite entanglement has not been established. Thus, even though the scheme proposed in this letter seems to operate optimally for any value of entanglement, we will forgo making such a strong claim.
Note that the key rate calculated in Fig. 2 is for the asymptotic regime. However, if we include the finite-size effects [58, 59] , there would be some circumstances that while positive finite key rates cannot be generated from optimal collective attacks [under the unrealistic assumption of infinite entanglement with E(γ→1)], by considering optimal individual attacks [under the assumption that Eve can distill a pure entangled state with E(γ min )] we are able to move from insecure regime to secure regime, and generate non-trivial positive finite key rates.
So, having access to a maximally entangled state is the trade-off in order to reach optimality in the teleportationbased attack without purifying the system, which is the assumption taken for the entangler cloner scheme. Both as-sumptions are non-realistic, however, the advantage of this type of attack compared to the entangling cloner is that it can be operated in the finite entanglement regime, in which it outperforms the optimal individual attack. Thus, the alloptical teleportation attack we introduced in this paper can be thought of as a universal eavesdropping scheme for Gaussian QKD, that can be reduced to either optimal individual or optimal collective attack depending on the available entanglement resources, without assuming Eve has access to the entire environment.
Finally, the fact that Eve needs an extremely large amount of entanglement in order to approach the optimal collective attack showcases the robustness of CV QKD protocols. Interestingly, even the minimum amount of entanglement given in Eq. (7) is arguably beyond current technological capabilities [60] . In DV protocols there is no need for a similar (finite entanglement) analysis, since maximally entangled states, i.e., Bell states, are not unphysical, and thus the entangling cloner scheme can operate without any unrealistic assumptions.
Future Directions. Apart from the proposed all-optical teleportation attack, another possibility for Eve would be to use the hybrid type of teleportation introduced in Ref. [20] . In this scheme a continuous variable state splits up to N twodimensional states (qubits), that can probabilistically be teleported through a DV teleportation protocol (the DV teleportation should also be adjusted in a measurement-free scheme similar to Ref. [16] ). In this scenario the need for infinite amount of entanglement of a single state is compensated with the need of infinite copies of Bell states. With any finite amount of splitting though, i.e., finite amount of Bell states, this protocol would simulate a non-Gaussian channel due to the inevitable truncation of the initial state, so it would be interesting to be investigated if this type of limitation gives any benefit to the eavesdropper.
Conclusions. In this work, we showed that optimal collective attacks in continuous-variable QKD are always based on an extremely strong assumption that takes different forms depending on the way we model the eavesdropper, i.e., fullsystem purification, simulation of an identity channel, access to a resource state with infinite amount of entanglement, access to infinite copies of Bell states. However, the requirement of having access to a resource state with infinite amount of entanglement can be "tamed", and a teleportation-based scheme can be modeled that operates in the regime between the optimal individual and optimal collective attacks depending on the available entanglement resources.
Supplemental Material Quantum Teleportation
Quantum teleportation is one of the key tools in quantum information theory, initially introduced for discrete variables [15, 16] , and then extended to CV systems [11, 17, 18 ] (see also [19] for a universal approach on teleportation).There are also protools for hybrid situations [20, 21] . The most well-known CV-teleportation protocol was proposed by Braunstein and Kimble (BK98) [18] , which is based on the distributed entanglement between the two parties, and the classically communicated results of Belltype measurements performed by one of the two parties. An alternative all-optical teleportation protocol was proposed by Ralph (R99) [11] , where the need of Bell-type measurements is eliminated, using instead a combination of a two-mode squeezer and a beam-splitter operation.
Let us assume that we want to teleport a (null mean valued) single-mode Gaussian state [27, 39, 43] with covariance matrix σ in from one place (laboratory 1) to another (laboratory 2). Regardless of the teleportation protocol, a necessary quantum resource in order to achieve that is a two-mode entangled state ρ (for the purposes of this work also Gaussian), shared between the two laboratories, i.e., a state with a covariance matrix given (in the standard form) by
which is a real, symmetric, and positive-definite matrix (we have substituted zero matrix elements with dots " · "). Its elements are proportional to the second-order moments of the quadrature field operators,x j :=â j +â † j andp j := i(â † j −â j ), whereâ j and a † j are the annihilation and creation operators, respectively, with [â i ,â † j ] = δ ij . The way we manipulate quantum correlations in order to achieve a successful teleportation depends on the protocol.
The quality of the teleportation protocol is limited by the amount of entanglement that is pre-shared between the two parties, and perfect teleportation is achieved only in the limit of maximum amount of entanglement resources. In CV systems, though, maximum entanglement is unphysical, since that would require infinite energy. Thus, realistically, instead of achieving a perfect state teleportation, we always end up with a slightly noisy copy of the target state. This process can be modeled as the decoherence that a quantum channel (completely positive trace-preserving map) induces to a transmitted state [? ? ].
The covariance matrix transformation when a phase-insensitive single-mode Gaussian channel G acts on one arm of a twomode Gaussian state σ in is given by [43] 
where U = √ τ 1 and V = v1. Significant phase-insensitive Gaussian channels are the following: (i) the lossy channel L with transmissivity 0 < τ < 1 and noise v = (1 − τ ) (pure loss L p for = 1, thermal loss for > 1), (ii) the amplifier channel A with gain τ > 1 and noise v = (τ − 1) (pure amplifier A p for = 1, thermal amplifier for > 1), (iii) the classical additive noise channel N with τ = 1 and noise v > 0, and (iv) the identity channelI with τ = 1 and v = 0, representing the ideal nondecohering channel.
In general, any Gaussian channel can be simulated via a quantum teleportation protocol using an appropriate resource state [45] [46] [47] . Given a Gaussian phase-insensitive channel G the set of resource states that can simulate it have been calculated in Ref. [48] , generalizing previous results [49] .
BK98 Teleportation Protocol
In the BK98 protocol one arm of the resource state is mixed with the input state through a balanced beam-splitter in laboratory 1, followed by a Bell-type measurement, i.e., dual homodyne detection (measuring thex quadrature on one arm and thep on the other), HD, and the results are sent to laboratory 2 through a classical channel, CC. Finally, in laboratory 2, a displacement operation proportional to the results of these measurements, D, is applied to the other arm of the resource state in order to reconstruct the input state, i.e., teleport it. Graphically this protocol is depicted in Fig. 1 (a) . With a Gaussian resource state of the form of Eq. (1), this teleportation protocol corresponds to a Gaussian phase-insensitive channel with transmissivity τ tel and noise v tel given by FIG. 1. Quantum eleportation protocols. In figure (a) we present the BK98 teleportation protocol via its basic components: (i) the dual homodyne detection, HD, between the resource state, ρ, and the initial state σin, (ii) the classical channel, CC, (iii) the displacement, D, and iv) the output state, σout. In figure (b) the R99 teleportation protocol is presented. In this protocol, the basic components are: (i) a two-mode squeezer Sg, (ii) a beam-splitter Bt, and (iii) the decoherence that the signal has to go through modeled with a quantum channel G.
where λ 0 is the experimentally accessible gain. Note that we assumed an infinite-energy limit in the Bell-type measurement detection.
R99 Teleportation Protocol
The R99 teleportation protocol was introduced in Ref. [11] and it is graphically presented in Fig. 1 (b) . In this protocol one arm of the resource state is fed into a parametric amplifier along with the input state in laboratory 1. The output amplified signal is directly sent to laboratory 2, which means that it has to go through some decoherence that can be modeled as a quantum channel G, that is initially shared between the two laboratories. Finally, in laboratory 2, we mix the signal with the second arm of the resource state on a beam-splitter, where the induced transmissivity is inversely proportional to the amplification applied in laboratory 1.
Let us assume that we want to teleport the same state σ in as with the BK protocol. In order to do so, we use a two-mode Gaussian resource state with a covariance matrix ρ of the form of Eq. (1). The initial state can be represented by a combined four-mode covariance matrix σ in ⊕ ρ. The amplification is achieved by a two-mode squeezer [50] , where the two inputs are the initial state and one arm of the resource entangled state. The corresponding symplectic transformation S g that the amplifier induces is given by
where g = cosh 2 r 1, with r ∈ R being the two-mode squeezing parameter. Note that the symplectic transformation S g is applied to the initial four-mode state σ in ⊕ ρ, where the identity sub-matrix of S g indicates that the second arm of the resource state remains unaffected at this stage.
